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1. Introduction
The recent Asian financial crisis has again focused attention on the risks of large-scale
private financial (non-FDI) capital flows to developing countries. Such flows may benefit
recipient countries, because they allow a faster build-up of the capital stock. But they also
pose the challenge of channeling the external funds to productive projects and avoiding
macroeconomic overheating in an economy that, as a rule, does not have a sophisticated
financial system yet. Moreover, they may make a country vulnerable to the serious
disruptive effects of sudden and large capital outflows. Due to their structural reforms in
the 1980s and strong fundamentals Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand were
able to attract large amounts of foreign capital until 1997. Their economies prospered,
achieving economic growth rates that far outstripped the global average. But after the
devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, these economies suffered a private capital flow
reversal of 100 billion dollar within a year, plunging them into an extremely severe
recession.
The events of 1997–98 raise the question what financial capital inflows do in
economies that are at an intermediate level of financial development. The burgeoning
literature on the Asian crisis emphasizes the behavior of banks in the transmission process.
Domestic banks play a dominant role in the financial intermediation process, as capital
markets are underdeveloped in these economies. Large banks, and firms sometimes as
well, operate under implicit government guarantees and poor supervision. Moreover,
banks have poor credit quality assessment and monitoring capabilities, and are often
undercapitalized. Moral hazard thus creates powerful incentives for external borrowing2
(which is sometimes also stimulated by fixed exchange rate policies) and for lending to
domestic parties that engage in excessively risky projects. The easing of liquidity
constraints facing firms and consumers stimulates aggregate demand, which may be biased
towards the nontradable sectors. The real estate sector, in particular, is prone to
overinvestment. The lending boom fuels a stock market and property market boom,
leading to increases in collateral values, which then may further sustain the credit boom. In
the end, the country may find itself with a current account deficit, an overvalued exchange
rate, and a financial system and corporate sector whose balance sheets are excessively
vulnerable to declines in asset prices, including the exchange rate and property prices.
When adverse shocks occur, concerns about the fragility of the financial system start to
mount, and may rapidly translate into the collapse of the exchange rate peg and a full-
blown financial crisis.
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Taking the story above as a starting point, this paper attempts to cast light on the
background of the Asian crisis by analyzing step-by-step what happens when a private
financial (that is, non-FDI) capital inflow enters a country. Unlike other papers, which
compare experiences across countries within a relatively short time-span on the basis of
annual or averaged data, this paper presents an in-depth description of the transmission
mechanism for Thailand in the pre-crisis years (1980–96) based on quarterly data. Such an
analysis provides a historical frame of reference for judging the Asian crisis. In order to
dissect the transmission process of private capital inflows we have assembled quarterly
data on a broad array of real and financial sector variables. We address questions like:
What is the reaction of the central bank to the capital inflow? Is there a subsequent surge
in lending, building activity, investment or consumption? Do private capital flows carry the3
seeds of a crisis by encouraging unsustainable current account deficits? Our empirical
methodology is borrowed from the literature on the monetary transmission mechanism, in
particular the paper by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996).
2 The focus on Thailand
is motivated by the fact that it was the breakdown of the baht-dollar peg that ignited the
Asian financial crisis in July 1997. The mechanisms stressed above may be easier to
uncover in the Thai case, since the experience of the other countries in the region is
probably tainted by contagion effects (Baig and Goldfajn 1999). In addition, Thailand has
received sizable amounts of foreign private capital since the late 1970s, making an
empirical analysis based on time series data feasible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some key
facts on the size and nature of private capital flows to Thailand during 1980–96.
Moreover, it briefly discusses central bank policies and the roles commercial banks,
finance companies and capital markets played in the financing of investment and
consumption in Thailand. Section 3 goes into some econometric issues, while Section 4
presents an empirical description of the transmission mechanism – the way private capital
inflows ultimately translate into changes in output and the price level. Section 5 discusses
whether the Thai baht crisis was more of a liquidity crisis than an external solvency crisis.
Section 6 contains a summary and discusses some policy implications.
2. Key facts about the Thai economy, 1980–96
This section presents some essential features of the Thai economy during the years 1980–
96, which are key to an understanding of the transmission mechanism of financial private4
capital inflows in this period. We present data on the size and composition of private
capital flows to Thailand, briefly discuss some central bank policies, and describe the
make-up of the financial sector, focusing on the different roles which commercial banks,
finance companies and capital markets played in the financing of certain types of
investment and consumption in Thailand.
Private capital inflows
Until the crisis broke in 1997, Thailand was very successful in attracting private capital
flows, as is evident from Figure 1. During the recent inflow period 1988–96, private
capital inflows averaged 10% of GDP per year. However, substantial inflows were also
recorded in the first half of the eighties. Thailand needed the capital inflows to finance its
persistent and large current account deficits, which since 1988 are largely driven by an
investment boom rather than a consumption boom (World Bank 1997). Investment as a
percentage of GDP increased from an average of 26% in the mid-1980s to an average of
41% in 1990–96. National saving sharply increased as well, but not enough to prevent a
steep increase in the current account deficit. Since 1987 more capital has flown into
Thailand than was needed to finance the current account deficit, translating into a growing
stock of international reserves. Between 1986 and 1996 Thailand’s international reserves
increased from 7% of GDP to 21% of GDP.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.]5
Table 1 contains data on the composition of the private capital flows. Although
measured as a share of GDP foreign direct investment has risen after 1987, its share in the
total private flow has been on a declining trend since the mid-1980s. Loans have always
been the most important component of the capital inflow, and since 1987 a shortening of
maturity has occurred. Between 50 and 60% of the financial (non-FDI) inflows are short-
term debt flows during 1987–96. The importance of portfolio capital has sharply increased
in the 1990s, accounting for about a quarter of total private inflows during 1993–96.
Central bank
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) can be characterized as a conservative central bank, whose
main objective was low inflation.
3 Average inflation (based on the CPI) was only 4%
between 1982 and 1996, which is very low for a developing country. Monetary policy was
anchored by an exchange rate policy aimed at a fixed parity with the dollar (Kochhar et al.
1996). Monetary policy was implemented by influencing short-term interest rates,
especially the cost of bank liquidity (Easterly and Honohan 1990). In general, the Bank of
Thailand did not rely on direct instruments (such as credit ceilings) for monetary control,
but used three indirect instruments instead: (1) frequent open market operations in the
repurchase market; (2) infrequent adjustments of the bank rate, used to signal changes in
the policy stance; and (3) moral suasion, which was feasible because of the high degree of
concentration of the banking system. Reserve requirements were only used for prudential
purposes, and were fixed at 7% of all deposits.
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Commercial banks
The Thai financial system was dominated by financial institutions rather than capital
markets. Commercial banks and finance companies accounted for about 90% of total
credit extended to the private sector at the end of 1996. Commercial banks are the most
important financial intermediaries, although their market share in the provision of external
finance to the corporate sector has declined from about 85% in the early 1980s to about
80% in 1993–95 (Callen and Reynolds 1997). For most of the period 1980-96 the banking
system counted 15 domestic banks and 14 foreign banks, as new entry was severely
restricted. Domestic banks dominated the banking system, accounting for over 95% of
total banking sector assets, with the five largest domestic banks possessing two-thirds of
total bank assets. Banks mainly attracted domestic funds by issuing deposits, mostly time
and savings deposits. In the 1990s foreign borrowing became an important alternative
source of funds as a result of capital account liberalizations and the relaxation of foreign
exchange controls.
5
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
The upper panel of Table 2 presents some data on the credit portfolio of the
banking sector. Bank loans as a percentage of GDP more than tripled between 1980 and
1996, reflecting in part a continuing process of financial deepening.
6 In general, the Bank
of Thailand relied on moral suasion to influence the lending policies of the commercial
banks. Banks had to submit credit allocation plans to the BOT every six months, but in
practice they determined their lending portfolios under few formal constraints (Easterly7
and Honohan 1990). About 20% of the bank loans at the end of 1996 went to the real
estate, construction and financial services sectors, which are relatively vulnerable to
cyclical fluctuations of the economy. Loans to the real estate sector have sharply increased
over time, from a share of 3% in the early 1980s to more than 11% in the early 1990s,
when the property market boomed. The share in the loan portfolio for personal
consumption purposes has risen steadily, from 8% in the early 1980s to 12% in the 1990s.
Finance companies
Finance companies were the other important class of financial intermediaries. There were
some 90 finance companies in Thailand, which accounted for approximately 20% of total
credit extended to the private sector.
7 Total credit outstanding rose from 8% of GDP in
1980 to 32% in 1996 (Table 2, lower panel). Their activities comprised short-term
finance, leasing finance, underwriting and security trade, and consumer finance. Finance
companies traditionally directed more of their lending toward riskier, but higher yielding
activities, because their cost of funds was higher and they faced even fewer restrictions
than banks on their lending practices.
8 Finance companies were big players in the markets
for consumer credit and real estate credit, with market shares of 37% and 47%
respectively in 1996. Margin loans on securities accounted for 8.5% of their loan portfolio
at the end of 1996. The lower panel in Table 2 shows that in the 1990s approximately
two-thirds of the loan portfolio went to the construction and real estate sectors, the
financial services sector, and consumer credit, which was twice as much as for banks. In
comparison with commercial banks, finance companies were thus much more exposed to
economic and financial shocks.8
Capital markets
The stock market played a modest part in the financing of private sector investment. Stock
market capitalization was in the first half of the 1980s very small, but grew spectacularly
from 7% of GDP at the end of 1986 to 105% of GDP at the end of 1993. This increase
was the result of an enormous hike in the share price index as well as a steep increase in
the number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. In 1986 only 98
companies were listed, while in 1993 this had risen to 347. Since then the share price
index has nosedived due to anxiety about financial weaknesses, but the number of listed
companies has continued to grow. At the end of 1996, total stock market capitalization
stood at 55% of GDP and 454 companies were listed. New issues of shares financed
around 5% of private sector investment between 1987 and 1995; before 1987 this was
only 1% (Callen and Reynolds 1997).
Finally, the Thai corporate bond market has always been small, although it has
expanded in recent years following liberalizations. Only since 1990 have public sector
enterprises issued bonds in significant amounts, whereas private sector companies were
not allowed to issue bonds until 1992 (Duriyaprapan and Supapongse 1996). Bonds issued
by private corporations have grown rapidly since 1993. Calculations by Callen and
Reynolds (1997) show that bond issues financed about 6% of private investment in the
period 1992–95.9
3. Econometric issues
To describe the transmission mechanism of private financial capital inflows, we employ a
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model, which can be written as
Z A Z A Z u t t p t p t = + + + - - 1 1 ... (1)
where Zt  is a vector of variables observed at time t, and p is the maximum lag of the
system. Conceptually, Z contains the private capital inflow (the beginning of the
transmission process), all the variables that transmit the capital flow shock through the
economy (the transmission variables), and output and price level (the end of the process).
The VAR disturbance vector ut is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and to have
covariance matrix V. The VAR model (1) is a reduced form that can be thought of as
being derived from the following structural model,
Z B Z B Z B Z e t t t p t p t = + + + + - - 0 1 1 ... (2)
where et  is the vector of the underlying structural shocks. et  has as covariance matrix the
identity matrix. The reduced form disturbances ut are thus related to the underlying
structural disturbances et  by
u I B e A e t t t = - =





0 0A A V = . The reaction of Zt  to shocks in et  (impulse response function) can be
calculated via
Z I A L A e t t = -
- [ ( )]
1
0 (4)
The transmission process can be described by the impulse-response functions (IRF) of all
Z-variables to a shock in the structural disturbance of the private capital inflow. We
estimate eq. (1) by ordinary least squares to obtain estimates of the matrices V and A(i), i
= 1, …, p.  A0  is calculated from V using the conventional Cholesky decomposition.
Hence,  A0  is a lower triangular matrix and ut is determined in a recursive fashion by et .
Our empirical analysis is based on quarterly data for the period 1980.I–96.IV. The
maximum lag p is set at 4 to allow for realistic lag structures. Consequently, 16 years of
data are available for estimation after using up one year of data as starting values of lagged
variables. There are numerous variables that play a part in the transmission mechanism.
Ideally, one would like to include them all in a single unconstrained VAR system, estimate
the model and then calculate the IRFs of all Z-variables in one go. Given the limited length
of the available time series, this is clearly impossible. On the other hand, including too few
variables in the VAR model runs the risk of significant omitted variables bias. Given this
trade-off, we follow the intermediate strategy employed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1996). Let us denote the transmission variables by X. For each X, we calculate the
IRF to a private capital inflow shock on the basis of a separate VAR model for which the11
vector Z contains five variables. Apart from X, Z always includes the following four key
macroeconomic variables: the log of the GDP deflator (P), the log of real GDP (Y), the
interbank rate (RB), and private capital flows (CF). Conceptually, our VAR is made up of
the two variables that represent the end of transmission process (P and Y), the variable
that starts it (CF) including the monetary policy reaction (RB), and one of the intervening
variables (X). The IRFs of the transmission variables X that are reported in Sections 4 and
5 are thus derived from different VAR models. They measure partial equilibrium effects in
the sense that potential interactions among the transmission variables themselves, which an
all-encompassing VAR system would accomodate, are neglected. As noted by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), a consequence of our approach is that the capital inflow
impulse is not exactly the same across the different VAR models, because the fifth Z-
variable is different. However, the fact that the IRFs of the four common variables (P, Y,
CF and RB) are broadly similar across the models, suggests that this is not a serious
problem in our case.
The global explanation of the Asian crisis, outlined in the introduction, serves as a
guideline for the selection of the transmission variables X. Consequently, the X variables
are related to central bank behavior (sterilized intervention), financial sector behavior
(credit creation), building activity, private investment and consumption, and the external
position. Due to data limitations, we are forced to resort to indirect indicators in a number
of cases.
9 Each VAR model also contains the following exogenous conditioning variables:
the current and one-period lagged values of the 3-month euro-dollar deposit rate, the
Japanese short-term interest rate, the yen/dollar exchange rate, a commodity price index12
denominated in dollar, a dummy to take account of the devaluation in 1984.IV, and
seasonal dummies.
10 Details on the data can be found in the appendix.
The disturbances are orthogonalized on the basis of the conventional Cholesky
decomposition. In that case, the ordering of the variables in the VAR determines the
pattern of recursivity, and thus may be of crucial importance for the orthogonalization of
the disturbances. The main identifying assumption in this paper is that the interbank rate
and capital flows do not contemporaneously affect real variables and prices, since the
latter are sticky in the short run. If X is a financial variable, say a credit aggregate, we use
the ordering P, Y, CF, RB, Xfin. If X is a real variable, say an investment indicator, then we
use the ordering P, Y, Xreal, CF, RB. We make an exception if X is an import variable,
because capital inflows may be directly linked to import flows. In that case Ximp comes
after CF, but before RB.
11
The time series we use, except the baht/dollar exchange rate, are non-stationary
(integrated of order one).
12 This brings up the question whether we should difference the
data. Employing differenced data has the drawback of neglecting potentially important
long-run relationships among the time series involved. Faust and Leeper (1997) argue that
– in part because the number of cointegrating relationships is unknown and thus has to be
estimated – imposing long-run restrictions will not necessarily improve the reliability of
structural inferences. Like a number of recent empirical papers on the monetary
transmission mechanism, we have therefore chosen to refrain from imposing cointegration
and to estimate unrestricted VAR models in levels.
13 Our approach still allows for the
existence of cointegrating relationships, however.13
4. The transmission mechanism
This section outlines the transmission process of a private financial capital inflow. We start
by discussing the capital inflow shock and its ultimate effects on real GDP and the price
level, which represent the end of the transmission process. We then describe the
transmission mechanism roughly in chronological order. As financial variables react faster
than real variables, we first focus on developments in the financial system, in particular the
response by the central bank and the impact on credit creation by financial institutions. We
then examine the effects on the stock market, the real estate market and private
expenditures. The empirical evidence is presented in the form of graphs of the impulse
response functions (IRF) of the transmission variables X after a one-standard error shock
to private financial capital inflows.
14 The IRFs are expressed as percentage points in
deviation of the baseline path. The broken lines indicate one-standard error bands.
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Private capital inflows and their effects on output and price level (Figure 2)
Capital inflows are measured as the growth rate of the stock of private foreign financial
liabilities. The stock of private foreign financial liabilities is measured in dollars, and has
been computed by cumulating private capital inflows excluding foreign direct investment
inflows. Figure 2a presents the private financial capital flow impulse, which can be
described as a one-time spike followed by a smaller but sustained inflow. The economy
thus reacts to the capital inflow in a way that attracts more capital. This can be explained
by the stimulative effects of capital inflows on domestic asset prices and economic activity
(see below). What kind of shock is a private capital inflow? In many ways it looks like a14
money supply shock, working its way through the economy in a manner familiar from the
literature on the monetary transmission mechanism. However, since a capital inflow also
constitutes a loosening of the resource constraint facing the economy, it can be viewed as
a supply shock as well. The capital inflow enables a faster accumulation of capital and
thus, after some time, an expansion of the supply of goods and services. Figures 2b and 2c
depict the responses of real GDP and the price level. Both variables are hardly affected by
the capital inflow in the short run, but they steadily increase as time goes by. After three
years output has risen by 0.6%, reflecting the output-enhancing effect of investment, while
the price level has risen by 0.3%. Nominal GDP thus rises by approximately 1%.
The response of the central bank: sterilized intervention (Figure 3)
If unchecked, the capital inflow would result in an appreciation of the baht, which would
be inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate commitment of the Bank of Thailand. The
central bank is therefore forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market and buy
foreign currency. The interventions show up as an increase in international reserves
(Figure 3a). On impact international reserve holdings increase by 1.5%, and ultimately by
over 3% compared to the baseline. By intervening the BOT succeeds in keeping the
baht/dollar exchange rate close to the peg, allowing a gradual appreciation of just 0.2%
(Figure 3b). Unsterilized interventions would translate into an equivalent increase in the
base money supply, and thus a substantial loosening of monetary policy. For this reason,
the central bank tries to mitigate the expansionary effect of the foreign exchange market
interventions by sterilization operations (Figure 3c).
16 Initially, it sterilizes to the tune of
2% of bank reserves, but after two years the total of the sterilization operations amounts15
to 8% of bank reserves. The sterilization attempts temporarily put upward pressure on the
interbank rate, but after two quarters the interbank rate falls by about 30 basis points, and
returns to the baseline in the next two quarters (Figure 3d).
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The response of the financial institutions: lending boom (Figure 4)
Despite the BOT’s sterilization efforts the banking system remains very liquid for about a
year. The banks’ nonborrowed reserves (Figure 4a) and especially liquid asset holdings
(Figure 4b), which can be easily transformed into reserve assets, display a sustained
increase until the fourth quarter after the capital inflow. In reaction, the banks lower their
lending rate by five basis points on impact and by another ten basis points over the next
few quarters (Figure 4c).
18 The greater availability and lower cost of credit is a powerful
stimulant to credit creation. Lending to the private sector by commercial banks grows
about twice as fast as nominal GDP (Figure 4d), while lending by finance companies
grows even faster (Figure 4e). Banks also disproportionally extend credit to finance
companies (Figure 4f), especially in the first few quarters after the capital inflow.
Commercial banks thus act as intermediaries for the much smaller finance companies to
give them access to foreign funds. The discussion in Section 2 showed that the lending
portfolio of finance companies is skewed towards real estate finance, consumer finance
and the financing of stock market investments. Since finance companies account for a
relatively large part of the credit creation, this implies that new lending is
disproportionately directed towards the stock market and the property market.
Effects on the equity and property markets: higher asset prices (Figure 5)16
On the stock market, real stock prices (Figure 5a) increase 1% on impact and ultimately
more than 3%. As quarterly data on real estate prices are unavailable, we rely on the logic
of Tobin’s (1969) Q-theory to present some indirect evidence that property prices too
increase.
19 As the construction of new buildings only makes sense when this is cheaper
than purchasing already existing buildings, it is likely that an observed rise in building
activity was preceded by a rise in real estate prices. There is indeed evidence that building
activity quickly picks up after a capital inflow. Domestic sales of cement increase sharply
after a capital inflow (Figure 5b), while building permit approvals also soar (Figure 5c).
Moreover, the relative price of construction materials shows a prolonged increase for two
years (Figure 5d), pointing to a sustained relative shift in demand for building materials.
The increase in stock prices and property values means an increase in the value of assets
that borrowers can put up for collateral. This gain in creditworthiness further stimulates
lending by banks and finance companies.
Effects on private expenditure: strong investment growth (Figure 6)
The combination of greater availability of credit, lower lending costs and increases in
equity and real estate values provides a powerful boost to private expenditure (private
consumption and private investment). Figure 6a shows that private expenditure grows
much faster than output: after five quarters private spending has risen by 1.5% compared
with 0.4% for output. How is the spending increase divided between investment and
consumption? Since data problems prevent a direct answer, we turn to import data to
produce some indirect evidence on this issue. Apart from the building boom suggested by
Figure 5, import data too suggest that investment rather than consumption mainly drives17
private spending. The initial capital inflow is partly used to finance additional imports,
which are fairly evenly divided between imports of consumption and capital goods
(Figures 6b–6d). However, the subsequent rise in private spending coincides with a huge
increase in imports of capital goods, as within a year these imports rise by 4%. By
contrast, imports of consumption goods, including those of durable consumption goods,
decline. Additional support for a dominant role for investment instead of consumption is
provided by the different behavior of the sales of motorcycles and those of vehicles
(passenger cars and commercial vehicles).
20 Vehicles can be considered to be mainly
investment goods, while motorcycles are mainly durable consumption goods. Sales of
vehicles broadly follow the same pattern as private expenditure (Figure 6e), but sales of
motorcycles only pick up after one year, when output has risen significantly, and they also
do not grow as strongly as vehicles sales (Figure 6f). The strong response of investment
translates into a higher capital stock and thus production potential. This increase in
aggregate supply explains why capital inflows have only limited inflationary consequences
(Figures 2b and 2c).
5. Was the Thai financial crisis a solvency crisis or a liquidity crisis?
A country that receives private capital inflows exposes itself to the risk that investors may
suddenly want to withdraw their money. It is conceivable that (large) private capital flows
carry the seeds of a crisis with them, because the transmission process also comprises
developments that can be viewed as weaknesses, such as current account deficits and real
exchange rate appreciation. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Radelet and Sachs (1998),18
Mishkin (1999) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b) argue that a lending boom
(Figure 4) in itself provides indirect evidence of greater fragility of the financial system,
because in a climate of rapid expansion of lending average loan quality is likely to
deteriorate. A similar point can be made about the construction and investment boom
(Figures 5 and 6), which is also likely to get accompanied by declining investment
efficiency. In case of adverse developments the banking system may be confronted with a
more serious bad loans problem. As the fiscal burden of a potential bailout rises, investors
may have more reasons to harbor doubts about the credibility of the implicit government
guarantee of the liabilities of the banking system and those of the private sector,
heightening the risk of a run on the foreign exchange reserves (Corsetti, Pesenti and
Roubini 1998a,b). In this section we discuss the effects private capital inflows have on the
external position and the vulnerability to a run on the foreign exchange reserves.
Effects on the external position: sustainable current account deficits (Figure 7)
Exports are hardly affected by capital inflows for about a year and they increase by 1% to
1.5% over the next two years (Figure 7a). This delayed response suggests that a
significant part of the private capital inflow is channeled into export-oriented sectors, but
that it takes time to implement the necessary investment projects. Imports initially go up
because the capital inflow is partly spent on imports, while after a short pause imports
surge in connection with the investment boom (Figure 7b). Capital inflows make the
economy more outward-oriented as both imports and exports increase more than output.
The behavior of the current account balance following a private capital inflow is
determined by the interplay of imports and exports of goods and services (Figure 7c).
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Accordingly, a capital inflow initially translates into a larger current account deficit. After
a temporary improvement, the current account goes into a sharp decline because of higher
imports, which is then reversed after two quarters when rising exports restore the current
account to close to its initial value over the next year. Capital inflows are thus associated
with sustainable current account deficits.
22
The modest increase in the real effective exchange rate is also testimony to the
sustainability of the current account position (Figure 7d). The small appreciation of the
baht and rising domestic prices translate into an increase in the real effective exchange rate
by 0.7% in the medium term. In view of the healthy growth of exports, this appreciation
does not seem to represent a significant worsening of competitiveness. It could partly
reflect an increase of the equilibrium real exchange rate, reflecting productivity gains in the
tradables sectors as a result of the extra investment. This interpretation is consistent with
the gradual rise of the relative price of nontradables, which is a measure of the internal real
exchange rate, by 0.3% over 3 years (Figure 7e). However, it is also possible that this
relative price change indicates that a substantial part of the spending increase falls on
nontradable goods and services (especially construction).
Effects on the vulnerability to a run on the foreign reserves (Table 8)
Following Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b) we
present three ratios that may gauge the vulnerability to a run on the foreign exchange
reserves. An increase in these ratios indicates a higher degree of vulnerability. The ratio of
total private foreign debt to international reserves initially decreases due to the
interventions aimed at preventing the appreciation of the domestic currency. This ratio20
ultimately returns to the baseline (Figure 8a). Hence the foreign exchange coverage of
total private debt temporarily improves and does not deteriorate over the medium term.
By contrast, a similar indicator using foreign liabilities of domestic banks and finance
companies as the debt variable does worsen over time (Figure 8b). Since the foreign
liabilities of the Thai financial institutions were largely of a short-term nature, private
capital inflows are associated with increases in vulnerability to a liquidity crisis.
23 Finally,
the ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves is a broader measure of
vulnerability, which refers to the credibility of the implicit government guarantee of the
domestic financial system. This indicator, which measures the vulnerability of a run on the
reserves by domestic residents, also improves rather than deteriorates following a capital
inflow (Figure 8c).
On balance, our empirical analysis offers supportive evidence for the view that the
Thai crisis was not an inevitable external solvency crisis. A remarkable finding is that
private capital inflows do not lead to unsustainable current account deficits, as exports
catch up with imports with a lag of about two years. Moreover, private capital inflows do
not cause a loss of competitiveness. Finally, the only vulnerability indicator that
deteriorates is the one that proxies for the risk of a liquidity crisis. The historical
experience suggests that the large current account deficits in 1995 and 1996, which partly
reflected large capital inflows, should not have raised questions of external solvency.
Based on the historical pattern, the current account was set to improve in 1997 and 1998,
so there was no urgent need for investors to withdraw their money from the country.
Consequently, the Thai baht crisis seems to be more of a liquidity crisis, in which financial
panic played an important role, than a genuine solvency crisis. Of course, the cumulative21
effects of nine years of large capital inflows had made the Thai financial institutions
vulnerable to changes in market sentiment or deteriorating expectations about their cash
flows and net worth. So when some investors did begin to retreat from Thailand, the
process quickly ensued in a scramble for the exit, rendering the 13-year old link between
the baht and the dollar unsustainable. After the fall of the baht, capital flight hit the rest of
the region as well – due to perceived similarities between Thailand and the other Asian
countries – and the Asian financial crisis was born.
6. Summary and policy implications
This paper aims at increasing our understanding of the background of the Asian crisis of
1997–98. Using quarterly data for the pre-crisis period (1981–96), we give an empirical
decscription of the transmission mechanism of private financial capital inflows, including
their effects on the external position.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Despite efforts by the monetary
authorities to mitigate their expansionary effects, private capital inflows are found to be
followed by higher asset prices, lower lending rates, and a surge in lending by financial
institutions to the private sector. The response of domestic spending is driven by sharp
increases in building and investment activity rather than a consumption boom. The higher
investment boosts productive capacity, and allows an expansion of output with limited
inflationary consequences. The current account balance temporarily deteriorates, since
imports initially go up sharply – in particular those of capital goods – and exports only
start to catch up after one year. There is also a modest appreciation of the real exchange22
rate, which hardly signifies a worsening of competitiveness as it does not preclude strong
export growth. Capital inflows also lead to greater integration in the world economy as
imports as well as exports tend to increase more than output.
Our findings provide corroborative evidence for the view that the Thai baht crisis
bears more resemblance to an acute liquidity crisis, in which financial panic played an
important role, than a genuine external solvency crisis. The historical record for 1981–96
suggests that foreign capital flows were spent in a responsible manner as the associated
current account deficits were sustainable and losses of competitiveness were avoided.
Moreover, capital inflows are correlated with a greater vulnerability to a liquidity crisis,
but not with a worsening of external solvency risk.
What are the policy implications concerning the prevention of a financial crisis?
Since external solvency appears to be less of an issue (at least for Thailand), crisis
prevention and containment revolves around reducing the build-up of perceptions of
vulnerability. The World Bank (1998, chapter 3) offers an overview on this topic,
discussing more flexible exchange rate regimes, better regulation and supervision of
domestic financial institutions, improvements in credit risk evaluation and monitoring
capabilities of domestic financial intermediaries, capital market reform, better corporate
governance, and provision of better and more timely information by central banks and
governments.
24 Such measures enhance the efficiency of the process by which investment
is allocated in the economy – and thereby limit the potential for ultimately destabilizing
asset market, lending, and investment booms – and also reduce the scope for panic.
Finally, another policy measure that has been advocated is restrictions on (short-
term) capital inflows. The argument is that short-term capital inflows carry fewer23
economic benefits than long-term (especially FDI) inflows, but are much more prone to
damaging reversals. However, the Thai experience suggests that such a policy could
involve considerable costs. We find substantial positive output effects of private financial
capital inflows, despite the fact that short-term inflows made up a large portion of total
financial inflows throughout the sample period (see Table 1). Apart from that, there are
serious doubts about the efficacy of capital controls in general.24
Appendix
A.1 Sources and construction of the data
The main sources of the data are International Financial Statistics (IFS), published by the
IMF, and the Statistical Appendix in the Monthly Bulletin and the Quarterly Bulletin of
the Bank of Thailand (denoted by BOT below). The numbers of the BOT Tables given
below refer to the ones in the 1997 issues of the Bulletins. In earlier issues the relevant
table may have a different number due to changes in coverage of the Statistical Appendix.
Its title is usually unchanged. Data have been collected for the period 1980:I–96:IV.
The stock of private foreign financial liabilities is measured in dollars, and
calculated by cumulating net private capital inflows, which are computed as net capital
inflows minus net official inflows minus net foreign direct investment (FDI). Quarterly
data on net capital inflows and net FDI inflows are taken from IFS, lines 78bd, 78be and
78bj. Quarterly net official inflows in baht are taken from BOT Table 44 (Balance of
Payments), and converted to dollars using the average baht/dollar exchange rate (IFS, line
rf). The end-1979 starting value of total external liabilities is taken from Global
Development Finance (World Bank). The end-1979 starting value of government external
debt is taken from BOT Table 27 (Government External Debt). The stock of international
reserves is from IFS, line 1d.
When the data for this research were collected, quarterly national accounts data
were not available. Quarterly data are constructed by interpolating annual data taken from
IFS, lines 90–99. For real GDP, the electricity consumption, calculated as total sales25
minus sales to residences, is used as interpolating variable. The source of the electricity
sales data (measured in kWh) is the Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics (Table 4.1 Electricity
– Installed Capacity, Energy Generated and Sold), published by the National Statistical
Office. Exports and imports of goods and services are interpolated by their respective
counterparts from the Balance of Payments statistics (BOT Table 44), deflated by the
GDP deflator. Public expenditure (public investment plus public consumption) is
interpolated by the current and capital outlays by the government, deflated by the GDP
deflator. The government budget data are taken from BOT Table 27 (National
Government Actual Expenditures by Major Economic and Functional Classification).
The GDP deflator is interpolated by the Consumer Price Index (IFS, line 64). Private
aggregate demand, the sum of private consumption and private investment, is then
calculated via the National Accounts identity, as GDP minus public expenditure minus
exports plus imports.
Lending to the private sector by banks is taken from BOT Table 7 (Assets and
Liabilities of Commercial Banks). That by finance companies is taken from BOT Table 22
(Assets and Liabilities of Finance Companies). Lending by banks to finance companies is
also taken from BOT Table 22. BOT Table 15 (Reserves of Commercial Banks) contains
data on bank reserves. Nonborrowed reserves are calculated as total reserves minus
liquidity credits by the central bank, taken from BOT Table 3 (Monetary Base). Liquid
assets of banks are taken from BOT Table 9 (Main Assets and Liabilities of Commercial
Banks). Liquid assets comprise vault cash, deposits with the BOT, other financial
institutions and banks abroad, government and public sector enterprise securities, and
gold. Base money and M2 are taken from IFS, lines 11 and 35l, respectively. The26
sterilization variable is calculated as holdings of government bonds and T-bills by the BOT
minus government deposits held at the BOT minus BOT bonds held by banks (see
footnote 16). The first three items are from BOT Table 6 (Assets and Liabilities of the
Bank of Thailand), the last one from BOT Table 7.
Imports of capital goods, consumer goods and consumer durables are from BOT
Table 33 (Imports by Economic Classification). They have been deflated by the GDP
deflator. Sales of motorcycles and vehicles (measured in units) are taken from BOT Table
61 (Domestic Sales of Manufactured Goods) for 1990–96, and from tables in the regular
reports on recent economic developments in the Quarterly Bulletin for earlier years.
Vehicles comprise both passenger cars and commercial vehicles, like trucks and buses.
Separate series for the two types are not available for the whole sample period.
Domestic sales of cement (including imports, measured in tons) are taken from
BOT Table 61 for 1990–96, and from tables in the regular reports on recent economic
developments in the Quarterly Bulletin for earlier years. These reports are also the source
of the construction permits (measured in square meters). The relative price of construction
materials is calculated as the ratio of the wholesale price subindex for construction
materials and the corresponding subindex for manufactured products. Source of the data is
BOT Table 66 (Wholesale Price Index for Thailand by Groups). The relative price of
nontradables is calculated as the ratio of a CPI subindex for nontradables and the WPI for
manufactured products. The nontradables subindex refers to housing, personal and
medical care, and recreation and education. Data (including spending weights) are from
BOT Table 69 (Consumer Price Index for Whole Kingdom by Groups).27
The interbank interest rate is taken from IFS, line 60b. The lending rate is the
minimum overdraft rate taken from BOT Table 23 (Structure of Interest Rates) and from
tables in the regular reports on recent economic developments in the Quarterly Bulletin.
Data for 1980–81 refer to the prime rate. The source of the US and Japanese interest rates
is IFS, lines 11160ldd and 60ea, respectively. The yen/dollar exchange rate (expressed as
yen per dollar) is taken from IFS, line rf. The commodity price index is calculated as the
average of the oil price and the world export price indices, both taken from IFS (line 466
in the table on commodity prices and line 001 in the table on export prices). The stock
market index in local currency is taken from the Emerging Market database of the
International Finance Corporation (IFC). Source of the real effective exchange rate based
on consumer prices is the Information Notice System of the IMF.
A.2 Impulse response functions
The IRFs of the four key variables (Figures 2a, 2b, 2c and 3d) are derived from the same
VAR system, where Z = (P, Y, CF, RB). All other figures show the IRFs of the various
transmission variables X. These IRFs are derived from the VAR model for which Z
includes X as the fifth variable. Regarding the ordering, Z = (P, Y, Xreal, CF, RB) for
Figures 5b, 5c, 5d, 6a, 6e, 6f, 7a, and 7e; Z = (P, Y, CF, RB, Xfin) for Figures 3a, 3b, 3c,
4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f, 5a, 7d, 8a, 8b and 8c; Z = (P, Y, CF, Ximp, RB) for Figures 6b, 6c,
6d, 7b and 7c.28
Table 1. Size and composition of net private capital flows to Thailand, 1980–96
80-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
(% of GDP)
Net private capital inflow 3.7 -1.0 2.0 6.8 9.1 11.7 12.3 9.1 9.0 8.5 13.0 9.5
(% of total inflow)
Foreign direct investment 18.8 -59.6 34.1 26.5 27.0 24.4 18.4 21.2 19.0 11.5 9.7 16.8
Portfolio - equity 0.5 -7.0 11.1 11.7 21.7 4.5 0.4 0.0 32.9 -4.5 10.1 9.3
Portfolio - bonds 4.3 27.1 -8.2 1.0 1.7 -0.9 -0.7 5.5 19.3 33.5 9.5 2.3
Long-term bank lending 58.6 87.5 -1.8 9.9 23.3 16.9 27.9 16.5 0.5 -0.2 13.6 48.9
Short-term bank lending 17.8 52.0 64.8 51.0 26.3 55.1 54.1 56.7 28.3 59.8 57.2 22.7
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 1998.29
Table 2. Lending portfolios of Thai banks and finance companies, 1980–96
1980 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Loans (% of GDP) 32.0 46.9 50.5 53.4 58.5 66.7 70.2 75.1 82.5 93.0 99.6 101.5
(% of total loans)
Total to high-risk sectors 22.2 24.2 27.6 26.6 29.4 31.6 32.1 34.0 33.8 34.4 34.1 33.4
    Construction 5.3 5.6 4.6 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.9
    Real estate 3.0 3.8 4.5 6.1 8.9 11.9 11.5 11.5 11.3 10.5 9.4 8.8
    Financial sector 6.5 6.1 9.1 6.2 5.9 5.1 5.5 6.1 6.0 7.1 8.0 7.1
    Personal consumption 7.4 8.8 9.4 10.1 10.8 10.6 11.2 12.3 12.6 12.7 12.3 12.6
Loans (% of GDP) 8.2 9.0 8.7 9.8 12.5 14.3 16.3 19.7 23.6 27.9 31.0 31.7
(% of total loans)
Total to high-risk sectors 59.1 61.3 64.2 66.0 67.3 68.8 67.6 64.6
    Construction 2.7 2.8 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.8
    Real estate 17.7 22.9 24.0 22.0 22.3 23.8 25.0 24.4
    Financial sector 9.1 6.7 5.7 8.0 9.1 10.4 10.7 10.6
    Personal consumption 29.7 28.9 31.9 33.0 32.9 31.6 28.9 25.9
Source: Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin and Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
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Figure 1.  Net private capital inflows and current account 
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Figure 2.  Private capital flows and their effects on output and price level
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Figure 3.  The response of the central bank: sterilized intervention
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Figure 4.  The response of the financial institutions: lending boom
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Figure 5.  Effects on the equity and real estate markets: higher asset prices
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Figure 6.  Effects on private expenditure: strong investment growth
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Figure 7.  Effects on the external position: sustainable current account deficits
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Figure 8.  Effects on the vulnerability to a run on the foreign exchange reserves
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Footnotes
1 See, among others, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999), Alba et al. (1998), Berg
(1999), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b,c), the IMF (1998), Mishkin (1999) and
the World Bank (1998).
2 As explained in Section 3 below, this methodology allows us to analyze many different
data series at the same time. Using flow-of-funds data, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996) employed it to trace the effects of a monetary policy shock through the financial
system.
3 See Warr and Nidhipradha (1996) for explanations of the macroeconomic conservatism
of Thai policy makers.
4 For a large part of the 1980-96 period the BOT could also influence market interest rates
more directly via manipulations of various interest rate ceilings. After 1982 they were
more frequently adjusted in order to better reflect market conditions and they were phased
out in the early 1990s. Ceilings on deposit rates were mostly nonbinding, while ceilings on
lending rates were non-binding for prime customers (large firms), but probably biting to
some extent for smaller firms during 1985–88 (Easterly and Honohan 1990). See Easterly
and Honohan (1990), Tivakul (1995) and Kirakul (1996) for more details on the
implementation of monetary policy in Thailand.43
5 See Robinson et al. (1991) and Kirakul (1996) for institutional details on the Thai
financial system, and Kirakul (1996), Duriyaprapan and Supapongse (1996) and Johnston,
Darbar and Echeverria (1997) for overviews of the financial liberalization process.
6 The mirror image of this development is the steep decline of the contribution of internal
funds to the financing of private investment from 75% in the early eighties to 25% in
1993–95 (Callen and Reynolds 1997).
7 In the aftermath of the crisis 56 finance companies were closed down by the government.
8 Until 1995 finance companies were not required to submit credit plans to the Bank of
Thailand.
9 For example, we use sales of cement, a key building material, to measure building
activity, and import data on consumer goods and capital goods to infer something about
private consumption and investment behavior.
10 The exogenous variables measure external factors affecting the Thai economy. Given
the baht-dollar peg, the Thai short-term interest rate is tied to the dollar interest rate. As
Japan is Thailand’s most important partner country for both exports and foreign capital,
we include the Japanese short-term interest rate and the yen/dollar exchange rate. Due to
the baht-dollar peg, the frequently large movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate
represent substantial changes in competitiveness. The primary commodity price index
measures supply factors. The devaluation dummy is one before 1984.IV and zero
otherwise. Although all data series are seasonally adjusted, either at source or by the X-11
method, we add seasonal dummies to correct for any remaining seasonality as a
precautionary measure.44
11 Placing P in front of Y reflects the well-known fact that the price level is stickier than
output in the short run. Putting RB after CF implies that the central bank can react
contemporaneously to a capital inflow. We have checked that the results do not materially
change if P and Y or RB and CF are interchanged in the ordering.
12 The baht-dollar exchange rate is an I(0) variable, which reflects the fixed exchange rate
commitment of the BOT. Results of the unit root tests are available on request.
13 See, among others, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996), and Ramaswami and Sloek (1998). See Hamilton (1994, Chapter 20.4) for a
discussion on the issue of ‘to difference or not to difference.’
14 The appendix lists the VAR models which underlie the IRFs in Figures 2–8.
15 Like Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), we show one-standard error bands. We
do this for presentational reasons, as displaying two-error bands would double the range
of Y-axis and thus “flatten” the IRF. As is well-known, standard errors for dynamic
inferences based on VARs are in general relatively large (see Hamilton 1994, chapter
11.7). This is likely to be even more true in our case, where the time-span of the data is
relatively short, and the data refer to a developing country. The purpose of the plots is to
concisely present the average response and a standard measure of the uncertainty
surrounding it. The bands should not be interpreted as confidence intervals associated with
conventional levels of statistical significance.
16 The Bank of Thailand has used three sterilization methods: selling public sector bonds,
selling BOT bonds, and transferring public sector deposits out of the commercial banking45
system to the central bank. Unlike other countries, the BOT has not used changes in
reserve requirements as a sterilization technique.
17 The finding that, due to the central bank’s reaction, capital inflows tend to be associated
with somewhat higher interbank rates in the short run may be a bit surprising, but this has
also been found for other countries that maintained fixed exchange rates and were
confronted by large capital inflows; see Corbo and Hernandez (1996).
18 It stands to reason that finance companies will also lower their lending rate, as the
lending rates charged by banks and finance companies tend to move together. (The latter
are only available from 1985.IV onwards.)
19 Although we cannot present direct evidence, it is clear from the literature on the Asian
financial crisis that capital inflows tend to push up property values.
20 The split-up of vehicles into passenger cars and commercial vehicles (trucks and buses)
is only available for part of the sample period. Measured in units, the share of passenger
cars is less than 30% of total vehicles. Their share in total expenditure will be much less
than that.
21 As the correlation between the current account balance and the balance on goods and
services is 0.98, the IRF of the balance on goods and services closely resembles Figure 7c.
22 Note that although the current account does not revert to zero, the same holds for the
financing private capital inflow.
23 Radelet and Sachs (1998) found that the ratio of short-term debt to international
reserves had predictive power for the onset of a financial crisis, while the ratio of debt to46
international reserves did not. They took this as evidence that the crises they studied were
liquidity crises rather than solvency crises.
24 See also Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998c) and Mishkin (1999).